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1. INTRODUCTION
The most recent decade was marked by an increasing global
interaction and interdependence arising from a rapid acceleration of trade
and investment, the creation and proliferation of new technologies, and
more efficient means of communication and transportation. This
globalization has resulted in the blurring of the boundaries between
domestic and foreign trade policies and has triggered a series of new trade
disputes.1 These new economicrealities have stimulated multilateral trade
negotiations which aim at eliminating barriers and distortions to
international trade, strengthening trade rules and discipline, and
liberalizing trade.
The Uruguay Round of negotiations, launched at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, in September 1986,is the most recent in a series of eight trade
liberalization negotiations that have been held since the GATT's2inception
in 1947. This Round is by far the most ambitious and complexto date, the
agenda incorporating a broad spectrum of economicactivity which has
never been previously negotiated on a multilateral scale. This Round was
scheduled to concludeby the end of 1990at the ministerial meeting of the
trade negotiations committee, held in Brussels from 3 to 7 December, 1990.
Owing to the persistence ofwidely differing views among the participating
1See Me Dougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188-94 (1968).
2 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, opened for signature, October 30,
1947,61 Stat. A.3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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2countries in some key areas of the negotiations, it was not possible to end
the Round as planned. These negotiations were suspended December 7,
leaving the international trading system in a period of uncertainty as to the
prospects for further trade liberalization and expansion of world trade. The
session collapsed due to a number of political deadlocks in some of the
major substantive areas of negotiations. In particular, agriculture and
trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), reflected fundamental
divergences in the positions of the participants. The talks, restarted in
September 1991, have not yet been concluded.
One of the issues on the 'Uruguay agenda' concerns intellectual
property rights worldwide. The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration
provides for the consideration of the trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPs). The mandate of the relevant negotiating group is
as follows:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that the measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the
negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and
elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines. The
inclusion of this issue in the Uruguay Round appears to have
been motivated by the concern of several developed countries to
ensure a minimum worldwide standard of 'adequate and
effective' protection, so as to protect the technology produced by
3them, thereby maintaining their competitive position in the
world markets. 3
TRIPs negotiations constitute a comprehensive and far-reaching
multilateral effort to establish international standards for IP protection, as
well as a first attempt to bring property rights into the multilateral system
of trading rights and obligations. It was included after hard bargaining
and strong opposition from some developing countries, particularly Brazil
and India who insisted that the GATr should not and does not contemplate
the negotiation of substantive IP standards.4 Not until April 1989 did the
developing countries agree to let negotiations on substantive standards
proceed, refuting the GATT's competence to promulgate new rules.
This issue has evolved into an area of major disagreement. The
industrialized countries are engaged in an effort to persuade the developing
countries to incorporate rules on the protection of intellectual property into
the framework of GATr. Because the proposed norms regarding the
recognition of IP rights might significantly effect wealth allocation between
the developing and the developed world, to the short-term detriment of the
developing world, developing countries have consistently and intensely
resisted the program with respect to the nature, scope and institutional
implementation of the legal regime to be established. The main focus of the
Uruguay Round is on reconciling differences between the developed and the
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions on Negotiating Structure and
Plans for the Uruguay Round, Jan. 28,1987,26 I.L.M. 850, 855 (1987); Bradley, Intellectual
Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the
Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INTL L. 57, 59 (1987).
4 See Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, GATT TNC Doc. MTN.TNCI7(MIN) 21 (Dec. 9, 1988).
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developing countries on the proper uniform standards for the protection of
IP rights abroad. The challenge of reconciling these divergent views is not
an easy one.
The condition of the world economy calls for an expeditious
conclusion of the Uruguay Round to regain momentum for trade
liberalization and trade expansion in order to restore general economic
growth. The maintenance of an open multilateral trading system is of great
importance to all countries. The Round has to achieve a balanced and
substantial package of results in all areas, and it has to address and satisfy
the vital interests of all participants. Failure in the Uruguay Round to
recognize and enforce IP rights will only intensify pressures to achieve
alternative solutions through increased reliance on unilateral sanctions.
For example, the U.S. resolve to protect IP rights, whether on a unilateral
or multilateral basis, has created widespread dissatisfaction with its trade
policy. The U.S. has been labeled a protectionist and a trade bully for
imposing coercive economic measures on countries it regards as not
providing adequate protection of IP. A retreat to this kind of protectionism
or an exclusive focus on regional or bilateral arrangements would put the
international trading system at great risk and could lead to a profound
crisis.
This thesis describes the "intellectual property problem" and how it
came to be the focus of GATT attention. It addresses the concerns of the
developed and the developing world regarding a reform in their IP
protection regimes. One of the results of this thesis is that reforms that do
not stem from developing countries' perceptions of their own interests and
needs, and that are not articulated in keeping with broader economic and
5technological policies, are unlikely to result in stable and predictable rules
or to be properly enforced.
2. TIlE GROWINGIMPORTANCEOF IP PROTECTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM
IP protection has acquired a high national and international profile
because inadequate and ineffective protection of IP against infringement
has substantially distorted international trade and led to a variety of trade-
related problems.
2.1 DEFINING THE IP PROBLEM
Inadequate and ineffective national protection for IP results in a
number of activities that distort international trade. These activities include
the copying of another's product for commercial purposes and the
unauthorized manufacture, sale or use of works, products and services
protected by copyrights, trademarks and patents. The intangible nature of
IP makes it particularly susceptible to piracy, a problem which is
exacerbated by evolving technology.
Industrialized countries claim billions of dollars in losses due to the
infringement of their patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets,
mainly by certain developing countries. The U.S. industry has estimated its
aggregate worldwide losses due to inadequate protection of IF in 1986 at $43-
61 billion.5 According to the European Parliament, several billion dollars of
5 THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE, KEIDANREN AND UNICE, BASIC
FRAMEWORK OF GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A STATEMENT
6
7counterfeit goods are sold annually within the European Community which
has resulted in the loss of 100,000 jobs in France and Gennany.6 In United
Kingdom, it is estimated that 100,000 jobs are lost due to COPYrightand
patent infringement.7 British publishers lost £130 million as a result of
COPYrightinfringement in 1986.8
Today, the U.S. and other policy makers in industrial countries are
engaging in significant efforts to seek stronger IP protection worldwide and
diminish international infringement of their products. The protection of IP
is increasingly perceived, mostly by these developed market economies, as
crucial to international competitiveness.
Due to the increase in international competitiveness and
international technological rivalry, the significance of technology to the
industrialized countries has greatly increased. These countries believe that
they have significant comparative advantages in technology. Constant
innovation has become the SYmbolof the economies of industrialized
countries, making technology and innovation major factors in
international economic competition. The industrialized countries contend
that the prospects for the industrialized countries to retain a major share of
the global market in the 21st century depend not only on their ability to
stimulate technological innovation, but also on efforts to ensure an orderly
diffusion of that technology through appropriate international legal
machinery. The growing share of knowledge-intensive products (like
OF VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN, JAPANESE AND THE UNITED STATES BUSINESS
COMMUNITIES (June 1988) (hereinafter called GAIT FRAMEWORK).
6Id.
7Id.
SId.
8computer software, computer hardware, semiconductor chips, space
satellite technology, and electronic machinery) in worldwide trade, together
with the increase in international competition and integrated
communication abilities, have magnified the economic significance of IP.9
IP has become fundamental to the growth and stability of many countries.
Therefore, IP's growing impact on trade has become the focus of many
studies and has sparked debates among the countries all over the world.10
The industrialized countries claim their IP system to be superior and
more efficient and want the developing countries to introduce the same
system with comparable standards and procedures. They argue that IP is
required to encourage the emergence of important new technologies, to
continue productive investment in increasingly expensive research and
development, and to enhance global distribution of the products of
intellectual efforts. This gives rise to a number of questions and concerns:
Why do the industrialized countries demand the adoption of their system?
How do they extend their traditional IP laws to other nations? Would it be
beneficial to other countries to adopt this system? What are the ways
industrialized countries may be able to persuade other nations to introduce
similar IP systems even though it may not be in their best interests to do so?
All these questions will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this
discussion.
Although most countries recognize the importance of IP protection,
there are significant differences in their approaches to this issue. The
9 See Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View
From the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 243, 254 (1989).
lOId at 254.
developed countries argue that "to speak of IP rights, as opposed to IP
privileges, tends to imply that IF rights are a universal obligation, rather
than an elective option."11They regard the protection of IF as a
fundamental right comparable to rights to physical property. In most
developing countries and many developed countries, by contrast, IP is seen
less as a body of fundamental rights than as a subset of their general
economic policies, to be managed for their contribution to economic growth
and industrial development.12
The ability of both the sides to muster refined counter arguments
based on social and economic tenets that stubbornly defy empirical
verification renders the conflict more acute. The developing countries'
continuous efforts to erode the existing levels of protection for IP and the
strong perseverance of the industrialized countries to strengthen IF laws
under GATT further exacerbates the resulting tensions. Inadequacies in
the current international agreements fan the fire.
2.2 EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF IP
Intellectual property, like other forms of property, is territorial in
nature and scope. Therefore, to make, use or sell an item in one nation,
which is protected in another nation, does not violate IF laws in the second
11See VanGrasstek Communications, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: United
States Trade Policy, Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND:
FURTHER PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES (1990).
12See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 2
(R.M. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988)
9
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nation. For this reason, innovators, artists and authors are obliged to file
for protection in each nation in which a significant market is sought or
anticipated. Such filings are supported or facilitated by a network of
international conventions. Most of the international conventions on IP are
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
WIPO was established by a convention signed on July 14, 1967, brought into
force in 1970 and made a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1974.13
The objectives of WIPO are:
a. to promote the protection of IP through cooperation among states;
h to encourage the development of new treaties and the modernization
of those treaties it presently administers; and
c. to promote national property protection around the world through
educational support and the provision of technical assistance.14
WIPO provides assistance to the developing countries in gaining
access to patented foreign technology, and locating technological
information.
The current regime consists of a series of international agreements
at the world and regional levels which have existed for over a century. The
principal worldwide agreements are the Paris Convention of 1883,15
covering patents, trademarks and other forms of industrial property, the
13 World Intellectual Property Organization, General Information (Geneva, 1984), p. 5.
14 See ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (1987).
15The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ofMar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, Washington June 2, 1911, The Hague Nov. 6, 1925,
signed at London June 2, 1934, Lisbon Oct. 31, 1958, Stockholm on July 14, 1967,53 Stat. 1748,
T.S. No. 941.
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Berne Convention of 1886,16for the protection of literary and artistic works,
and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) of 1952,17on copyrights.
i. Paris Convention
No international laws specify explicit rules for the protection of
industrial property. Each country has specific industrial property laws
which cover only acts accomplished in that country. International
agreements generally do not establish rights but are designed to harmonize
these divergent national laws.
The Paris Convention of 1883, officially titled the International Union
for the Protection of Industrial Property, with approximately 100 signatory
nations, addresses patents, trademarks, service marks, industrial designs,
utility models, trade names, indications of source, appellations of origin
and unfair competition.
This Convention has two major provisions: (a) "national treatment"18
i.e., equal treatment of nationals and non-nationals; and (b) "right of
priority"19 when filing for the same patent or trademark in any signatory
nation within one year. National treatment is tantamount to no protection
16The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886,
completed at Paris, on May 4,1896, revised 1928, 1948, 1967, 1971, effective July 10, 1974
[reprinted in 7 COPYRIGHT 135 (1971)].
17Universal Copyright Convention, ratif£ed Sept. 6, 1952,6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.AS. No. 3324,
216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971,25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.AS. No. 7868.
18Arts. 2 and 3 of the Paris Convention. 'National treatment' requirements bar signatory
nations from discriminating against foreigners by offering them weaker patent protection
than the protection accorded to nationals.
19Art. 4 of the Paris Convention. 'Rights of priority' stipulates that once an application for
protection is filed in one signatory nation, the applicant has one year to file in any other
signatory nation, which then shall consider such an application as if it were filed on the
same day as the original application.
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at all for companies which operate in countries that do not have their own
domestic law. The agreement does not require member nations to upgrade
or enforce domestic laws.
This Convention, with only one exception (article 5 quarter), leaves
signatories a large measure of discretion in determining the scope of
national laws on patents and trademarks. Member nations retain
considerable latitude in excluding products from protection and issuing
compulsory licenses in cases of non-work.2o Also, they are free to grant
nationals certain forms of preferential treatment like subsidies and tax
abatements.21
The U.S. is not a member to all industrial property agreements.22 For
example, it does not belong to the Lisbon Agreement as the U.S. wine
exporters use of the terms "burgundy" and "champagne" would violate its
appellations of origin provision.
li. BerneConvention
The Berne Convention covers the protection of literary and artistic
works. It is an international copyright convention negotiated in 1886 and
revised in 1971. Its membership has increased from ten nations to more
than eighty, including the entire European Community, many communist-
bloc states, numerous developing countries, and, as of March 1, 1989, the
United States.
20 Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Survey of
the Literature 11 <Wolfgang Siebeck With Evenson, Lesser, and Primo Braga 1990).
21Id. at 12.
22 ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 5.
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The Berne Convention establishes a system of rights and obligations
that protects and furthers the dissemination of intellectual works in the
international arena. Like the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention is
based on the principle of providing "national treatment"23 to the works
created by nationals of other member states. But unlike the Paris
Convention, it stipulates a so-called minimum Protection which can be
claimed in any member state, even though the domestic law does not
provide this protection. Copyright protection under the Convention is
extended without the formalities of applications or examinations. The
minimum period of protection is the lifetime of the artist or the author plus
50 years.
ill. Universal CoPyright Convention (UCC)
The UCC, established in 1952, is a multilateral copyright treaty
sponsored and administered by the United Nations Education, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).This Convention deals with the
rights granted to the authors, artists, composers and film-makers.24It is
less stringent than the Berne Convention and provides for a minimum of
protection equal to the life of the author plus 25 years for most works. It
provides for "national treatment" for copyright holders ofmember
countries. To receive protection under the UCC, authors must complywith
the procedural requirements of their own nation's copyright statutes. It
does not actually establish international standards ofprotection. The
23 Art. 5 of the Berne Convention.
24 See Note, IntelkctU4l Property Rights and the GATT: United States Goals in tM Uruguay
Round, 378 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 382 (1988).
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United States has withdrawn from UNESCO but it still adheres to the
UCC.25
Figure 1 provides an overview of the WIPO Membership and the patent
protection allover the world as of 1988. [See Figure 1 on page 16-17.]
This international regime for the protection of IP rights is one focus
of concern in the current policy debates. The negative impact of inadequate
international protection of IP on the U.S. stems from several aspects of
WIPO:26 Most of the conventions simply mandate "national treatment" and
do not require a nation to enact any legislation. None of these have a
legitimate, well-structured dispute-settlement mechanism. If a signatory
member violates the treaty, there is no punitive remedy that can be awarded
to the injured party. Also, there is no international enforcement under
these conventions.27 Enforcement is left to the national courts of these
signatories, leaving an aggrieved party to fend for itself in the local courts.28
The conventions do not provide adequate substantive norms covering the
important subject-matter areas, for example, trade secret protection
receives no recognition in the treaty system. Semi-conductor chip protection
is not subject to an international agreement.29 In sum, the multinational
25 See Dam, The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property,
21INTL LAW. 627, 631 (1987).
26 ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 4.
27 See Dam, supra note 25, at 630; Deborah Mall, The Inclusion of a Trade-related
Intellectual Property Code Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265 (Winter 1990).
28See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 52.
29 See Note, Third World Questions the Need For Integrated Circuit Treaty, 34 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 59-60 (May 21, 1987). Such agreements have been
stymied by the developing countries.
15
conventions have not been ideal mechanisms for challenging non-
compliant countries.
The U.S. and a few other industrialized countries like Japan and EC
have had the most difficulty contending with the direction and the
momentum ofWIPO policies. From the U.S. perspective, apparent
impotence of WIPO to deal with the trade-related problems of IP is due to
the fact that it was never intended to address trade-related distortions,
leading the U.S. and other industrialized countries to consider using GATT
as a vehicle for improving the level of international multilateral standards.
FIGURE 1
OVERVIEW OF WIPO MEMBERSHIP AND PATENT PROTECTION
WORLDWIDE AS OF 1988
COUNIRY DURATION MEMBERSHIP AVAILABLE PATENT PROTECTION
OF 1:Petty Patents 2:Pharmaceuticals3:FoodProducts
PROTECTI· 4: ChemicalProducts 5: Plant/Animal Varities 6:
-ON Surgical Procedures 7: Micro-organismsand
Products Thereof
PARIS BERN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Argentina 5, 10, 15c * * * * * *
Austria 16b,d * * * * * * * *
Belgium 20a * * * * * *
Bolivia 15e * * *
Brazil 15a * * * @ @ * *
Canada 17c * * * * *
China 15a * *
Columbia 5c, d * @ @ * *
Denmark 20a * * * @ * *
Egypt 15a. d * * * * * *
France 20a * * * * * *
Germany 20a * * * * * * *
Hune-ary 20a * * * *
India 14b * * *
Iran 5,10,15,208 * * * * * *
Iraq 15a * * * * * *
Israel 20a * * * * * *
SOURCES: World Bank Discussion Papers (1990),WIPO (1988),Gadbaw and Richards
(1988).
NOTES :a from filing date; b from publication date; c from grant date; d extention
possible; * denotes membership; @ processes patented under some circumstances.
Italy 20a * * * * * *
Japan 15.:> * * * * * * * *
Jordon 16a * * * * * * *
Korea l.2J * * * * * *
Libya 15a,d * * * * * *
Malaysia 100 * * *
Mexico 14c * * @ @ *
Nigeria 20a * * * * * *
Norway 20a * * * *
Pakistan 16c,d * * * * * *
Peru 5c, d * * *
Poland 15a * * * *
Sweden 20a * * * * * *
Spain 20a * * * *
Sudan 20a * * * * * * *
Thailand 15a * * * *
Taiwan 100 * * *
U.S. 17c,d * * * * * * * *
U.K. 20a * * * * * *
Venezuela 5, lOe * * * *
Yugoslavia 7b,d * *
Zambia lEi> * * * * * * *
3. THE U.S. CONCERNSWITHINADEQUA1E PROTECTION OF IP
In recent years, the United States' dominant position as a leader in
the world trade has eroded significantly.30Last decade, the U.S.
experienced an enormous trade deficit as its appetite for imported goods
consistently outpaced its exports.31The U.S. trade deficit for 1988 amounted
to $170 billion.32As the deficit proved detrimental to the health of the U.S.
economy, a primary focus of the U.S. trade strategy has been the reduction
of this enormous trade deficit, predominantly by boosting its exports.33
Trade analysts have concluded that the major impediments to growth in
exports are foreign barriers to trade. Foreign "piracy" of IP has been cited
as a major barrier to the U.S. exports.34Revenues lost by the U.S.
companies due to the worldwide sales ~f the products made without
authorization utilizing the IP of the U.S. IP owners, have been estimated to
as much as $35 billion per year. This represents approximately 15 percent
of the U.S. trade deficit.35 Former United States Trade Representative,
Clayton Yeutter, stated that "Wecould shrink the U.S. $170 billion trade
30 See Tyson, Trade Deficit Has Lethal Fallout, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1989, § IV, at 2, col. 4.
31 Pine, America's Import Addiction, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § D, at 1, col. 2.
32 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS
YEARBOOK 402 (1989).
33 See generally Peterson, Analysts See Need for Further Cuts in Imports, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1988, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
34 See FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (1989),
35 See generally Edward A. Finn, Jr., "That's the $60 Billion Question", FORBES, Nov. 7,
1988, at 40.
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deficit appreciably simply by adding proper protection for our IF rights
around the world. "36
Safeguarding IP rights from foreign infringers has emerged as one
of the most important trade policy goals of the U.S ..37 Americans who
engage in international trade are very concerned about the lack of adequate
and effective protection of IF rights in many foreign markets. The share of
the U.S. exports that rely heavily on the protection of patents, copyrights,
trademarks and trade secrets has more than doubled in the post-war
period, and now amounts to over one-fourth of the total U.S. exports.38
These goods include pharmaceuticals, chemicals, computers, software,
movies, books, sound recordings and electrical machinery. [See Figure 2 on
page 20.]
The U.S. argues that it is not only losing money, but more
importantly, its economy is losing the competitive edge it gains from
research and development, innovation and creativity. As a nation it simply
cannot afford it.
36 See Note, Intellectual Property and Trade Deficit, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.3, at 71
(Feb. 10, 1988).
37 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, GAOINSI AD-87-65 (1987) (hereinafter called
GAO Report).
38 Intellectual Property, Domestic Productivity, and Trade: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., !st Sess. 2 (July 25, 1989) (statement of Ambassador
Carla A. Hills).

2 1
3.1 PIRACY
Piracy is a vague term that has no settled legal definition.39 In the
broadest terms, it can be defined as the unauthorized and uncompensated
duplication of another person's intellectual efforts for commercial
purposes.40 The U.S. protects IP rights because the government recognizes
the public interest in granting the innovator, author, producer, researcher
or artist some form of exclusive control over the production, sale or
distribution of their creative intellectual achievements. This control works
as an incentive for these creative people to risk investing the time and
money necessary to innovate. However, this arrangement may break down
when pirates misappropriate the IP by making, using or selling it for
commercial gain without the owner's authorization and without paying
royalties to compensate the owner.
In its progressive shift to an information based economy,the U.S.
has become increasingly vulnerable to piracy.41Piracy not only directly hits
the U.S. IP owner, it also has a number of indirect effects on the U.S.
economy. Piracy in certain industries like software makes research and
development and artistic creativity less profitable and less attractive. This
may result in the delay of important inventions and creations and slow the
pace of world development. This reduction in the research and development
and loss or delay of productivity curtails emplOYmentin the U.S. industries
39 See generally Simone, Protection of American Copyrights on Books in Taiwan, 35 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 115, 116 n. 1 (1988).
40 See Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of
a GAT/' Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747,775 (1989).
41Id at 770-80.
23
foreign products much lower than the originator's own marginal costs.46
Second, the home market of the IF owner, i.e., the U.S., where the pirated
goods are illegally imported. The U.S. is reportedly the largest market for
foreign counterfeit versions of domestic products. Lower priced
unauthorized versions of the original products, unless specifically excluded
by border measures or enjoined by domestic IF laws, can drive the U.S. IP
owners out of their home markets altogether.47 Third, the markets of all the
other countries to which the products are exported; Once the pirated goods
become good enough to satisfy the local demands, pirates introduce them
into international trade and compete on advantageous terms with the U.S.
exporters selling the genuine goods at higher prices. Consequently, the
U.S. exporters are not only driven out of the pirating nations' markets, but
also suffer a marketing barrier in these other countries. In sum, piracy
displaces sales of legitimate goods in the domestic market; it decreases
exports to, foreign sales in, and royalties from the countries that abuse IP;
and it shrinks the markets for legitimate goods in third countries.
The U.S. argues that if the pirate nations were encouraged to adopt
stricter IP protection, which is similar to that existing in the U.S. and other
developed nations, the U.S. products could potentially be more competitive
internationally and the U.S. exports would increase.
46 See Dam, supra note 25, at 627-28.
47 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 34. The protection against the importation of
products which infringe U.S. IP laws is also provided for in the Trade Act of 1988. See
U.S.C.A § 1337 (West Supp. 1989).
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3.2 ESTIMATES OF FINANCIAL LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE U.S.
INDUSTRY AND TRADE
A number of the U.S. and international bodies have tried to quantify
the financial losses suffered by the U.S. IF owners, due to piracy in the
three above mentioned markets (home market of the pirate, home market of
the U.S. IP owner, and other countries' markets).48 Estimates of the
economic cost of pirated IP are staggering. Commercial piracy of the IP
costs the U.S. economy billions of dollars and thousands of jobs each year.49
A report produced by the U.S. International Trade Commission
(lTC)50 in 1988, at the request of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), is
the most recent and influential study on this issue. USTR asked the ITC to
prepare a comprehensive study of the "distortions in the U.S. worldwide
trade associated with the deficiencies in the protection provided by foreign
countries to the U.S. intellectual property rights."51 The ITC calculated the
distortions caused by trademark counterfeiting, and infringement and
misappropriation of copyrights, patents, semiconductor chip design, trade
secrets and other types of IP based on the data from a questionnaire it sent
to approximately 500 U.S. firms involved in the foreign trade.52
48 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 92-97 (approaching the problem by identifying
significant 'pirate' countries and then attempting to quantify estimated losses in the form
of 'pirate sales' in these countries).
49 See generally Hoffman, Marcou & Murray, Commercial Piracy of Intellectual
Property, 71 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 556 (1989).
50 Foreign Protection Of Intellectual Property Rights And The Effects On U.S. Industry
And Trade, USITC Pub. No. 2065(1988) (Report to United States Trade Representative,
hereinafter called ITC REPORT).
51 Letter from Clayton Yeutter to Susan Liebeler (Jan. 12, 1987), reprinted in ITC REPORT,
id. at app. A, A-2.
52 ITC REPORT, id. at vii. 431 firms responded to the questionnaire.
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The ITC estimated more than $23.8 billion of losses in 1986 which
were due to inadequate protection of IP. Extrapolating these losses, to cover
the entire national economy, USTR Clayton Yeutter placed all U.S.
companies' losses between $43 billion to $61 billion.53 Many kinds of losses
were included in these figures: lost export sales, displacement of U.S.
domestic sales by infringing imports, lost fee and royalty payments,
reduced profit margins, damage to reputation caused by pirated goods and
foregone research opportunities.54 The Report estimated that 150,000 to
750,000 U.S. domestic jobs were lost as a result of illegal use of patents,
trademarks and copyrights. The ITC Report attributed a significant
concentration of estimated losses to certain developing countries and newly
industrialized countries: Brazil, India, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore and Mexico.55
The industries that appear most affected are chemical, cosmetics
and pharmaceutical companies, movie and music owners, publishers,
computer companies involved in hardware and software, and fashion
designers. It is common to see copies of Ralph Lauren polo shirts or Reebok
tennis shoes selling for a few dollars in the developing countries rather
than the high price for originals.
Profits for patent and copyright pirates in high-tech industries like
computer hardware, semi-conductors or pharmaceuticals are very high
because the infringers can sell products far below the original price since
53 T. Raum, Trade Panel Decries Piracy of Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, AP, Feb. 26,
1988.
54 ITC REPORT, supra note 50, at 4-4, Table 4-2 (listing factors that contributed to u.s.
companies' losses of revenues because of inadequate intellectual property protection).
55 [d. at 4-16,4-18.
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no research and development costs have been incurred. For these
industries, the key expense is no longer the cost of production but the cost of
innovation, which must be recouped from the sales in volumes both at
home and abroad. For example, it costs a pharmaceutical company a new
drug $125-180 million for research and development over a ten year period
to develop, 56but it takes virtually no time or money to copy one already
developed. Similarly, a new family of semi-conductor integrated circuits
typically costs over $100 million to develop57but no time or capital
investment to copy it. A copy of a popular $500 U.S. software package can be
bought in the Far-East for $7.50.58 Twenty-five percent of the two-billion
records and tapes sold in the world are counterfeit with prices in some
countries as low as twenty-five percent of the legitimate price. 59
In a 1989 Foreign Trade Barriers Report (FTB Report),60 the USTR's
Office identified the most serious existing defects from the U.S. government
point of view in foreign IF legal regimes. The findings of this report
matched with those in the ITC Report. The FTB Report, however, did not
quantify the losses, it talked in terms of substantive law and enforcement
deficiencies. Taken together, the ITC and FTB Reports highlight a lack of
patent coverage for chemicals and pharmaceuticals, overly permissive
compulsory licensing of patents, inadequate copyright legislation and
56 See GAT!' FRAMEWORK, supra note 5.
57 See Schapiro, The Role of Intellectual Property Protection and International
Competitiveness, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1989).
58 Breaking New Grounds in U.S. Trade Policy: A Statement by the Research and Policy
Committee for Economic Development 58 (1991).
59 See GAT!' FRAMEWORK, supra note 5.
60 See USTR, 1989 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 2-4 (1989).
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enforcement with respect to the audio, video and software sectors in a
significant number of developing countries.
The above mentioned reports in the ITC survey are often disputed due
to a number of reasons. It is argued that quantifying piracy in terms of
financial losses to the U.S. business enterprises is difficult because it
involves several highly uncertain and hypothetical factors and involves
speculation.61 The approach of compiling data through questionnaires to
the industries involved is surely not ideal as it relies on several debatable
assumptions. The statistics should be viewed with skepticism as they are
based on the industries' own unverified estimates.62 Some authors have
questioned the ITC Report's methodology and expressed concern about
unsubstantiated estimates by companies that have an incentive to claim
serious damage by piracy.63 The ITC figure of $43-61 billion in annual losses
by industries due to inadequate IF protection seems rather inflated. The
studies carried out by Gadbaw and Richards64 show a figure of $3.4 billion
for 1986, which is significantly lower than the figures provided in the 1987
ITC Report. Gadbaw and Richards tried to quantify the aggregate losses
due to piracy by identifying the seven most problematic countries
(Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan) which had some of the largest pirate industries in the world. [See
Figure 3 on page 28.]
61 See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual
Property Negotiations in the GA'lT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 689, 698 (1989).
62 See Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991).
63 See Hoffman, Marcou & Murray, supra note 49 GAO Report, supra note 37, at 14-15.
64 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 379-83.
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Of the nations studied, the level of pirate sales was the greatest in
India followed by Brazil, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, Mexico
and Singapore. Of the industries studied, pirate sales were the greatest in
pharmaceutical industry, the audio recording industry, the video recording
industry, the software industry, the agricultural chemical industry, the
semi-conductor industry and the book publishing industry [See Figure 4 on
page 30.]
They made worksheets for each country and industry, to estimate
pirate revenues, by collecting data on the domestic market size, exports, the
level of domestic production, and current revenues of the IP owners. These
figures were then utilized to estimate the possible increase in the revenues
of the U.S. IP owners obtained through the elimination of piracy. 65
These studies by no means represent a complete list of industries
affected that have suffered losses from piracy. The list includes those
industries that have suffered losses from piracy in a number of developing
countries, and which the U.S. government officials, industry groups and
industry associations have repeatedly mentioned as the most injured by
inadequate IP protection. Many other industries, such as fashion apparel,
athletic footwear and watch industries, have also suffered losses
particularly due to trademark infringement in the developing countries.
These losses have not been quantified by Gadbaw and Richards in their
study.
65 [d. at 92.
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The U.S. IP owners claim that the loss is large even if one takes into
account the probability that the available economic data may magnify the
injury to the U.S. industry and trade.
3.3 INADEQUATE PROTECTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Another area of U.S. concern involves newly emerging technologies.
Piracy has soared in recent years by the advent of new technologies as they
make it easier and more inexpensive for the pirates to get access to, copy
and transmit the data.66 For example, Fiber-optic technology can transfer
100 average length novels over a distance of 100 miles in one second.67 The
proliferation of video and audio-taping equipment like compact disc (CDs)
and digital audio tapes (DAT) has enabled the pirates to produce cassette
tapes virtually indistinguishable from legitimate recordings.
Approximately 80 percent of the audio' tape market in Portugal, Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia, India and Thailand is controlled by pirates.68 Similarly,
personal computers enable pirates to make exact replicas of computer
software conveniently in their homes or offices. The development of new
semi-conductor chips or a software may cost enormous time and millions of
dollars, but setting up a plant to reproduce them can be done for a fraction
66 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 39.
67 Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics
and Information 9 (Apr. 1986).
68 See Hoffman & Marcou, The Costs And Complications of Piracy, SOC"Y, Sep. 1990, at 28,
col. 1; International Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers, The Extent of
Piracy of Sound recordings worldwide in 1986 (1988).
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of this sum. Italy has five pirated copies of software for every one purchased
legitimately.69
The traditional IP system is breaking down in the wake of these new
information and communication technologies. Recent advancements in
computer software, biotechnology and space satellite technology fit
imperfectly under either the patent or the cOPYrightparadigms.70 For
example, satellite signal piracy has emerged as an increasing problem in
Taiwan as it affords no protection to it at all. 71Pirates with satellite dishes
extract broadcast signals from the air-waves and re-transmit them for
commercial purposes.
The vulnerability of new technologies could potentially cause the
greatest harm to the U.S. economy as the U.S.'s competitive advantage has
historically been in the development of new technologies, such as
computers, semi-conductor chips and biotechnology.72 The U.S. argues that
the emergence of these technologies forces a re-evaluation and re-definition
of existing IP right classifications and forms of protection. Japan and
European Community share this concern.
69 Software Pirates Find Italy's Land Has No Byte, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1988.
70 See Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scienti{u: Know-how: Implications of
Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 648-
67, 690-98, 714-18 (1989).
71 See Note, Making Intellectual Property Pirates Walk the Plank: Using "Special 301" to
Protect the United States Rights, 12 LOY. L. A INTL & COMPoL.J. 725, 731 (1990).
72 See Tyson, Managing Our High-Tech Trade, L.A TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, § IV, at 2, col. 4.
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3.4 EFFECT ON THE EXISTING GLOBAL SYSTEM OF IP
PRO'lECTION
Rampant piracy of IP has a number of adverse effects on the existing
system of IP protection worldwide. It threatens the very existence of the IP
system as the inventors and innovators, in order to recoup the research and
development costs and to appropriate all benefits of their inventions, become
reluctant to disclose/patent their inventions. They try to protect their
inventions/knowledge from piracy by secrecy in trade as long as possible
and try to exploit it before the imitators catch up. This confounds the
underlying principle of the patent system which is designed to inform the
public about important inventions that have been made and already are
protected, so that the duplication of efforts and expenses can be avoided. The
non-disclosure of inventions also burdens further research on the same or
related products or processes as it cuts off valuable information.73 This
large scale piracy can weaken and destabilize the existing patent system by
reducing the incentive for the inventor to disclose.
Similarly, counterfeiting defeats the main functions of the trademark
system when consumers are unable to recognize the products of specific
manufacturers. Customers stop relying on known trademarks for
standard of quality and safety, losing confidence in the trademark system
as an indicator of quality. This reduces manufacturers' incentives to
produce high quality products.
73See Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round- Negotiating Strategies of the
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INTL L. 1317 (1990).
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On the other side, manufacturers in the developing countries that
tolerate piracy gain an artificial competitive advantage in the world trade
as they do not pay royalties for the use of foreign IP. They incur minimal
research and development costs for marketing their knock-offs, and also
suffer little risk as they free-ride on the successful products. Coupled with
their own typically cheap labor, pirates can provide low cost products to the
consumers. This profitability entices other small scale manufacturers into
pirating, thus making piracy endemic, spreading it to other countries with
weak IP protection system. The problem of piracy becomes deep-rooted and
difficult to cure, posing a threat to the existing global systems of IP
protection.
3.5 ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR STRONGER PROTECTION OF IP
IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The U.S. and most developed countries believe that IP rights
protection system modelled on current OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) practice would sufficiently stimulate
economic growth and effectively promote valuable economic activity, such
as research and development, foreign investment and the diffusion of
technology, in the developing world. 74 This view, however, is not universally
held, particularly among the developing nations. Serious disagreements
remain, revolving around questions like - whether the protection of IP is of
74 See Reichman, supra note 40, at 763-764.
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net benefit to a developing nation or whether the potential benefits of such
protection are outweighed by the costs of introducing such a system?
An influential segment of the U.S. IP community is promoting
developing country protection of IP based on claimed benefits to those
countries. Whether the benefits are higher than the costs remains a much
debated thesis without any empirical verification.75 There is no strong
evidence that the developing countries will necessarily benefit or lose from a
reform of their IP systems.
The proponents of enhanced IP protection frequently refer to a paper
by M L. Burnstein 76 in arguing that IP protection plays a positive role in the
economic development of the developing countries.77 This paper, however,
does not base its claim on empirical evidence and arrives at this conclusion
on the basis of assumptions and predictions concerning economic behavior.
Economists in industrialized countries argue that stronger
protection of IP will produce a variety of long-term benefits for the
developing countries.78 They suggest the following impacts of increased
levels of IP protection:
a. Increase in technology transfers and foreign investment - In order to
attract foreign expertise in high-tech industries which rely heavily on IP, it
is indispensable for a developing country to strengthen its IP protection.
This is so because the technology owners do not have an incentive to
75 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 27-29,47-50; Primo Braga, supra note 9, at 258-
64.
76 See M.L. Burnstein, Diffusion of Knowledge-based Products: Applications to Developing
Economies, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 612,615-18 (1984).
77 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 21 & n.21; SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 158 (1990).
78 See Deborah Mall, supra note 27.
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transfer their proprietary knowledge to countries with weak IP protection
system, in view of the potential for piracy.79
h Stimulation of local innovation and technology infrastructure - IP
protection promotes domestic innovation by providing additional incentives
to the local innovators to invest more resources in the technological
advancements by guaranteeing a greater economic return for innovations
that are successful.
c. Increase in the global technological innovations resulting from better
protection in all countries.
d. Decrease in the 'export-revenue losses due to trade sanctions.' Primo
Braga suggests that the export-revenues which are lost when trade
sanctions are imposed against developing countries having significant
trade links to the industrialized world should also be included among the
variables considered in the benefit function.8o For example, Brazil could
have saved $39 million in 1989 had it provided strong patent protection to the
pharmaceutical products.
The economists conclude that IP protection is not only beneficial to
the society as a whole, but is also beneficial to consumers due to the
availability of quality products which result from the provision of IP
protection. It enables the developing countries to grow at a faster rate and
improves the standards of living in the developing world.
The economists argue that the apparent advantages of piracy are
more illusory than real. Most of the advantages accrue in the short run,
while most of the losses are defered to the future generations. By failing to
79 See SHERWOOD, supra note 77.
80 See Primo Braga, supra note 9, at 262.
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develop their own technology-producing capabilities, these countries
burden their future generations with lower quality and lesser variety of
goods, inflated prices and lower labor productivity and competence.81 Also,
piracy diminishes the incentives for indigenous innovation and fosters the
'brain-drain' of the most able innovators of the developing countries.82 For
example, India's lax IP protection constitutes a disincentive for computer
programers to stay and work in their home country. Transfer of technology
through piracy occurs in a vacuum and is not accompanied by the transfer
of training, experience, know-how and trained man-power, that comes
with the legitimate transfers of technology. Therefore, full use of available
knowledge and development of new technologies cannot occur.83
Economists in industrialized countries recognize that there are
short-term loses in the form of lost pirate revenues and the reallocation of
resources, which accrue to the developing countries while strengthening
their IP laws, but contend that these loses are outweighed by the long-term
benefits enumerated above.84
3.6 DISENCHANTMENTWITH WlPO
The U.S. is genuinely disenchanted with the existing IP regimes as
they are not sufficient to mitigate the extensive trade distortions and
81 See Hoffman & Marcou, supra note 68.
82 See Emmert, supra note 73.
83 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 29.
84 See, e.g., MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, The Economic Significance of Piracy, in
Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 89-91,97-108.
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economicdamage caused by the piracy of IP rights.85 Its primary objection
involves the extreme laxity of the conventions' rules.86 The attitude of the
U.S. towards these treaties has been summarized as follows:
The protection offeredby these rules, however, cannot cure
many of the intellectual property problems faced today by
America's creative industries. First, 'national treatment'
becomes meaningless when the national law of developing
countries are inadequate, or not enforced. Second, the limited
number of signatories and the conventions' lack of application
to non-member countries also diminish their effectiveness.
Finally, the lack of mechanisms for consultations, for dispute-
settlement or for remedying violations limits their
usefulness.87
In addition to its failure to provide substantive norms and effective
dispute settlement procedures, this system is criticized for its lack of
attention to some important new technologies. The agreements have failed
to keep pace with the technological advances.88
Also, member countries are not required to enact any national laws
protecting IP as long as the national laws are non-discriminatory against
85 UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (Nov. 5, 1987); see also Dam, supra note 25.
86 See Gadbaw & Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New GATT Round, in
Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 49, 52.
87 See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
TRADE POLICY: VIEWS OF THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 13 (1985).
88 See Robert P. Benko, Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay Round, 11 WORLD
ECON. 217, 221 (1988).
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foreigners. Consequently, almost every pirate nation is in full compliance
with the terms of the conventions, since it provides no IP protection to its
own domestic industry. The U.S. retaliatory action against such nations
could conceivably punish nations for practices which are in accordance
with the international law. For example, if Brazil, a member of a WIPO
convention, provides "national treatment" to U.S. IP owners (its domestic
IP law being not very strict for the nationals as well) it is in perfect
harmony with the existing international law on IP. If the U.S. imposes
trade sanctions against Brazil for lax IP protection, it shall be a retaliation
against the existing international norms and standards on IP.
Another area of dispute is over the granting of compulsory licenses
by the member nations to insure that the registered patents are put into
commercial use.89 The U.S. finds this practice particularly troublesome,
since it takes the use of the patent out of the control of the inventor.9o
The U.S. has complained about the United Nations' voting style in
WIPO, i.e., each country has one vote and decisions are made by a simple
majority.91 In WIPO, the developing countries, the industrialized countries
and the socialist countries have almost always voted as a bloc or a group.
This is particularly annoying for the U.S. as the majority bloc of the
developing countries in WIPO can prescribe their views on the
industrialized countries' minority bloc.
89 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar. 20,
1883, as amended, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, art. 5.
90 Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Hearings Before the Energy and Commerce
Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1986).
91 Heritage Foundation, New Threats to Intellectual Property Rights, 761 BACKGROUNDER
8 (1990).
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A more fundamental problem is that not all countries subscribe to
WIPO or all the conventions. Some of the most problematic countries are
not members and therefore not subject to the convention rules. For
example, India, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand are not signatories to the
Paris Convention. Taiwan, Korea and China are not signatories to the
Berne Convention.92
Industrialized countries have unsuccessfully tried to enhance
WIPO's role as an effective forum against international piracy. In fact, the
previous levels of minimum standards are also eroding and deteriorating
as the developing countries are trying to make IP conventions more flexible.
Due to all these problems with the existing international convention
system, the U.S. and other affected industrialized countries are looking for
a new multilateral solution to the piracy dilemma in order to protect their
self-interests.93
92 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION, GENERAL INFORMATION,
WIPO Pub. No. 401 (E), at 15, 44 (1988).
93 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 9.
4. U.8.ATrEMPTSTO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
Mechanisms to protect expanding research and development costs
have evolved in the recent years in response to the growing levels of IP
piracy facilitated by emerging new technologies. The statutory mechanisms
in the U.S. IP law range from purely domestic laws intended to enforce its
own IP regime, to confrontational bilateral measures that can be used to
pressure developing countries into meeting U.S. demands.
The U.S. has employed a three-pronged attack to combat piracy.
First, in order to provide a stable home base for the U.S. companies, the
U.S. has strengthened domestic IP laws to curtail the export of certain
strategic technologies and to slow importation of counterfeit goods into the
U.S.. Second, the U.S. has tried to pursue bilateral negotiations that enforce
compliance through trade sanctions with individual problem countries.
Third, the U.S. has tried to seek relief through multilateral negotiations in
the GATT.94
These instruments collectivelycomposea menu of options for the
U.S. interest groups and policymakers who often face the question of
precisely which instrument would be best suited to achieve their goals and
objectives. The purpose of this section is to assess the instruments that the
U.S. has at its disposal to fight the problem ofpiracy.
94 See Leaffer, supra note 62. See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 214 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole
Ganz Brown eds. 1990) (hereinafter called Rushing & Brown).
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4.1 UNILATERALMEASURES
Congress has recently undertaken comprehensive initiatives to
strengthen the protection afforded to the U.S. IP owners. It has responded
to piracy with a series of major amendments to the patent, copyright and
trademark acts.95 These legislative developments have plugged loopholes
and have enhanced coverage and protection under the U.S. law. For
example, until 1984 the U.S. patent law did not protect the products made
abroad that infringed upon patented processes. The enactment of the Patent
Law Amendments Act plugged this 100phole.96 In addition, the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 198497 amended the Lanham Act to greatly strengthen
the remedies in civil suits against international counterfeiting.
Another prospective major change in the U.S. patent law would be
the adoption of a first-to-file system for the patent protection in place of the
first-to-invent rule98 practiced at present in the U.S. This change would
harmonize the U.S. patent law with the rest of the developed countries.99
95 See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Tenn Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417,98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1990»; Trademark Counterfeiting Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 2178 (codified in scattered sections of 18. 19,28 U.S.C.);
Trademark Clarification of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1116-18, 18 U.S.C. § 2311, 2300); Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98
Stat. 3383 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295,42 U.S.C. §§ 2182, 2457, scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.); Pub. L. No. 100-159, 101 Stat. 899 (1987) (semiconductor chip protection act
extension) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935; Generic Animal Drug Patent Tenn Restoration Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-670, 102 Stat. 3971 (1988); Inventions in Outer Space, Pub. L. No. 101-580,
104 Stat. 2863 (1990).
96 35 U.S.C. § 271(G) (1984). See also ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 12.
97 Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 2178 (1984).
98 The first-to-invent system, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982), protects the first inventor
and is perceived in the United States as being a more fair system. Most countries use a
first-to-file system, which often results in a race to the patent office.
99 See Lachica, U.S. is offering to Revise its Patent Code if Other Countries Agree to
Reciprocate, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1988, at 21, cot 3; Dunner, First-to-File: Should Our
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Important changes have also taken place in the U.S. copyright laws
conferring enhanced protection for the copyright owners and increasing
penalties for copyright infringement.10o Computer software and databases
were given protection by a 1980 amendment.101 Traditional IP laws proved to
be inadequate for the protection of certain new technologies, especially
biotechnology and information technology. Congress extended protection to
these areas by enacting the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) of
1984.102This Act provides protection to semiconductor chips; it gives the
creator of a semiconductor "mask-work" control of reproduction,
importation, distribution and sale for ten years.103
Moreover, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 authorized the President
to impose import restrictions on goods from countries that do not adequately
protect IP rights. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) of
1984 requires the President to evaluate Caribbean countries' protection of IP
rights before awarding them tariff preferences. A more recent law with
antipiracy provisions, the 1988 Trade Act,104simplifies patent infringement
proceedings under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 before the
International Trade Commission. It provides the U.S. patent owners a new
cause of action for infringement of a U.S. process patent by foreign
manufacturers exporting to the U.S .. The private citizens can now petition
the ITC for relief. If the ITC determines that an imported product does in
Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 561 (1988); U.S. May Consider
Dropping First-to-Invent Rule to Get Japanese Changes, Panel Told, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 305 (Mar. 8, 1989).
100See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
10117U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
102Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 904 (1988».
103 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 12.
10419 U.S.C. § 1337(i)(A), (B) (1988).
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fact violate a valid patent of an industry that either exists in the U.S., or is
in the process of being established, then it may issue a "cease and desist
order" (an order to the foreign firm to discontinue the practice), or an
"exclusion order" (an order to the U.S. customs service to bar entry of the
imports). The "exclusion order" remains functional as long as the patent,
trademark or COPYrightis valid.
Finally, the amendment of Section 337 under the 1988 Trade Act has
reduced the injury standards significantly. Prior to this amendment, the
law required the petitioner to prove to the ITC not only that the imports in
question violated his IP rights, but also that he suffered substantial injuries
and that the domestic industry was economically and efficiently operated.105
As amended in 1988, this section requires the petitioner merely to
demonstrate that the U.S. domestic industry exists. The requirements to
prove injury or that it is "efficiently or economically operated" have been
eliminated. These changes facilitate rulings in favor of petitioners by
reducing their burden of proof.
In brief, these amendments increase the likelihood that a petitioner
will win his case and raise the possible penalties for non-compliance.
105 See Antoinette M. yon dem Hagen, Trade-Based Remedies for Copyright
Infringement: Utilizing a "Loss-Preventive" Synthesis, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 99 (1989).
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4.2 THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS: SPECIAL 301 OF THE
TRADE ACT OF 1988.
Guarding against piracy is exceedingly difficult since the U.S. IP
laws have a limited extra-territorial effect.106 Foreign piracy ofIP is not an
infringement unless it occurs within the U.S.;107 therefore, the U.S. relies
on multilateral and bilateral trade agreements with its trade partners to
establish IF standards. lOB
The U.S. government has undertaken an intense program of direct
bilateral negotiations, coupled with the threat and use of unilateral
economic sanctions, to attempt to improve foreign protection for the U.S. IF
owners.109 These negotiations effectively promote the U.S. interests. They
target practices of a particular country offensive to the U.S. interests and
coerce the non-complying countries to adopt adequate standards of
protection.110 Ifbilateral persuasion is-ineffective, the U.S. threatens to
impose unilateral economic sanctions.
106 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1983); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1977). Section 271(a) provides that "whoever
without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent." Section 501(a) provides that
one "who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States ... is an infringer of the
copyright. "
10735 U.S.C. § 271 (1983); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1977).
lOB Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Hearings Before the Energy and Commerce
Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 36,91-92 (1986).
109 See, e.g., Efforts to Negotiate Bilateral Agreements to Curb Piracy Continuing, PTO
Offreial Says, Int1 Trade Rep. (BNA) 1433 (Oct. 26, 1988).
110 For details of the cases initiated by the USTR against the target countries, see OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES (Dec. 14, 1989).
According to this Table, 68 cases were initiated between 1974 and 1988. Half of these cases
were terminated pursuant to successful bilateral or multilateral negotiations which
improved the allegedly unfair trade practice while five cases were terminated because the
claim under s. 301 was not justified or the petition was withdrawn. [d.
46
Congress strengthened the U.S. hand by the 1984 trade law
amendments that identified inadequate IP laws of the U.S. trading
partners as constituting a basis for retaliatory action under Section 301.111
But the current main weapon for exerting pressure on foreign countries is
the so-called Special 301 IP provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive
Act of 1988.112 This Special 301 specifies the "carrots" and "sticks" available
to the U.S. trade negotiators in order to attain their objectives. The 1988
Trade Act expressly finds that the "international protection of IP rights is
vital to the international competitiveness of the United States persons that
rely on the protection of IP rights. "113 President Reagan, in signing the 1988
Trade Act, stated that Special 301 will "strengthen the ability of U.S. firms
to protect their patented, copyrighted, or trademarked goods and ideas from
international thievery. "114
The Special 301 authority is designed to enhance U.S. ability to
negotiate improvements in foreign IF regimes through bilateral initiatives
that carry in the background the threat of retaliation in the form of
restrictions on access to the U.S. market. This section places the entire
burden of adjustment upon the U.S. trading partners. The statute requires
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), within thirty days after
the submission of the National Trade Estimate Report115 to the Congress, to
111Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 301-304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2487).
112 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (enacted Aug. 23, 1988, amending the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-316, §§ 302(b), 182 (1974».
1131988 Trade Act, § 1303(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 1107,1179 (1988).
114 See President Regan Signs Trade Bill Into Law, Saying Nation Now Speaks With One
Voice, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1184 (Aug. 24, 1988).
11519 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988). Section 2241(b) requires the publishing of the National Trade
Estimate Report, which is due on March 31st of each succeeding year.
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analyze foreign countries' laws and initiate accelerated six-month
investigations of countries that deny "adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights, "116or "fair and equitable market access to
United States persons who rely on intellectual property protection."117
Under the Special 301 mechanism, the USTR first must identify
"Priority Foreign Countries",118 who are the most egregious IP
transgressors119 and have the greatest adverse impact on U.S. products and
who are not making significant progress in negotiations with the USTR.120
All countries that deny adequate protection, whether de jure or de facto, are
considered in this designation process. This finding is based upon the
USTR's annual trade barriers report, the petitions received from firms and
industry groups, and consultations with other officials in the United States
Government (e.g., the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks;
Registrar of COPYrights).121A list of these priority countries must be
published in the Federal Register.122 .
The USTR does have some discretion, however, as the statute
specifies that the agency need not initiate such a case if it "determines that
the initiation of the investigation would be detrimental to the United States
economic interests."123 The USTR is authorized, but is not required, to
retaliate by increasing duties or imposing other restrictions on imports.124
11619 U.S.C. § 2242(aX1)(A) (1988).
117[d. § 2242(a)(lXB).
118 [d. § 2242(a).
119[d. § 2242(b)(1XA).
120 [d. § 2242(aX2), (b), (c).
121[d. § 2242(bX2).
122 [d. § 2242(e).
123 [d. § 241l(a)(2)(B)(iv).
124 [d. § 2416(b). The goods selected for duties or restrictions need not be related to the
disputed practice of the priority country. § 2411(c)(3).
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The USTR can revoke such identification at any time.125 In the event of
revocation, the USTR must provide a detailed explanation of the reasons for
such revocation in its semi-annual report to the Congress.126 The USTR has
explicit authority to enter into binding agreements with foreign
countries. 127
Since the enactment of Special 301, the U.S. has taken responsive
action against two nations. In reaction to a USTR investigation of Brazil,
initiated at the request of the Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Association
(PMA), President Reagan imposed $39 million in ad valorem tariffs on a
variety of Brazilian imports as a consequence of Brazil's continuing refusal
to extend product and process patent coverage to pharmaceuticals. 128This
sanction was equal to the USTR's estimate of lost sales by the U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers due to patent piracy in Brazi1.129
Similarly, the U.S. retaliated against Thailand by dropping it from
the Generalized System ofPreferences-(GSP) program,130 for its failures to
adequately protect IP .131The GSP treatment allows several developing
nations to export goods to the U.S. without many of the duties normally
imposed on developed nations.132
125Id. § 2242(c)(1)(A).
126Id. § 2242(cX2).
127Id. § 2411(a), (b)(2), (c)(2)(C), (d)(3)(B)(i)(II), (d)(4)(B).
128Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 40th Report, USITC Pub. No. 2208, at 134-
35 (1988); Gerstenzang & Pine, U.S. Moves to Curb Imports From Brazil, L.A. TIMES, July
23, 1988, § 1, at 1, coI. 3.
129Regan, Charging Patent Piracy, Imposes Sanctions on $ 39 Million of Brazilian Goods,
Int'} Trade Rep. (BNA) 96 (Jan. 25, 1989).
13019 U.S.C. §2461 (1989).
131Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative, 54 Fed. Reg. 3, 573 (1989);
President Regan Denies Thailand Larger asp Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property
Record, Int'} Trade Rep. (BNA) 96 (Jan. 25, 1989).
132 19 U.S.C. §2461 (1989).
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In 1989, rather than identifying countries as "Priority Foreign
Countries" under Special 301, the USTR created an intermediate step, not
required by Special 301, by establishing a "Watch List" of twenty-five trading
partners,133 whose practices deserved special attention. This watch list
identifies two categories of countries with unfair IP trade practices.134 The
first category, or "Priority Watch List" countries, are those that could meet
the statutory criteria for priority country identification but are making
some concessions in recent bilateral or multilateral negotiations.135 The
USTR gave these countries six months to make improvements before
naming them as priority countries under Special 301. The second category
of "Watch List" countries are those that have a lesser degree of inadequate
IP protection. Seventeen countries were placed on this list and were given
one year to prove progress. 136This intermediate approach was intended to
prod these countries into action, without actually retaliating against them,
giving the USTR more time to use pressure without resorting to the actual
initiation of formal procedures. This tactic met with a mixed reaction from
Congress; some legislators applauded the USTR's restraint, while others
criticized the action as being weak.137
133See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet "Special 301" on
Intellectual Property, May 25,1989, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 718,719 (May 31,
1989). See also USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under
Super 301, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31, 1989).
134 Id.
135Id. at 719. The eight countries placed on the priority watch list are Brazil, India, Mexico,
People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Thailand.
136 Id. Countries on the watch list include Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt,
Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Portugal, Philippines, Spain,
Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
137USTR Defends Administration's Naming of of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super 301,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31, 1989); Rep. Gephardt criticized the Bush
Administration for not taking stronger action and for not making "these intellectual
property pirates walk the plank." 135 CONGoREC. E 1552-53 (daily ed. May 4,1989).
T
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Threatening trade sanctions is a strong tool in dealing with some
countries, but is ineffective with others. Special 301 has achieved significant
improvements in IF protection in Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Saudi Arabia, Japan and Indonesia,138 while Argentina, Brazil, India and
Mexico have shown no improvement at all. 139As a result, on Aprll26, 1991,
the USTR identified China, India and Thailand as "Priority Foreign
Countries". These had been on Special 301 "Priority Watch List" since the
first annual review in 1989. However, there appears to be a direct relation
between a developing country's reliance upon exports to the U.S. and the
country's willingness to improve its IP protection.140 Specifically, the
Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (three of the top few GSP
beneficiary nations under the U.S. GSP program) have made genuine
efforts to provide greater level of IF protection under the U.S. pressure.141
They fear huge losses of export revenues if the U.S. imposes trade sanctions
against them. India, on the other hand, has not responded favorably to the
U.S. coercion as its major exports are to the EC and Japan and not to the
U.S ..142It gains more from the Japanese and the EC trade-benefits.l43
138 See, e.g., U.S., Indonesia Sign Bilateral Agreement to Protect Copyright, Effective Aug.
1, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)464 (Apr. 12, 1989);China Agrees to Push for Copyright Protection
of Computer Software, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)818(June 21,1989).
139For details refer to Wilson,A Trade Policy Goal for the 1990's: Improving the Adequacy
and Effectiveness of Intellectual Property Protection in Foreign Countries, 1TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 421,437-443(1988).
140 See Fusae Nara, A Shift Toward Protectionism Under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act:
Problems of Unilateral Trade Retaliation Under International Law, 19HOFSTRAL. REV.
229,233-34(1990).
141Korea and Taiwan, whose IP policywas untill recently based on the traditional Chinese
culture, in which the highest form ofcomplimentan artist or author couldreceivewas to
have his work copied,have made significant legislative changes. See Gadbaw and
Richards, supra note 12,at 19.
142See id at 23.
143 See J. JACKSON& W.DAVEY,INTERNATIONALECONOMICRELATIONS1158(2d ed.
1986).
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Similarly, Argentina and Brazil have made no changes in their IF laws.
This shows that the U.S. trade pressure to combat piracy may prove
ineffective with those countries whose legitimate exports to the U.S. are not
a significant portion of their GNP.
The United States Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 ties the application of
the GSP or the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) program144 to the
willingness of participating countries to adopt higher standards of IP
protection. These programs were initially intended to provide a sort of free-
market form of foreign assistance by offering non-reciprocal, duty-free
treatment of certain qualifying products that the beneficiary countries
export. In recent years, however, these programs have been used as
indirect tools by American trade negotiators. The privileges under these
programs are increasingly conditional upon meeting the U.S. trade
demands on IP and other issues.
Another form of coercive negotiation employed by the U.S. in IF
issues is that the U.S. applies a strict definition of reciprocity in the
protection of IF related to computers. Under the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984, the U.S. provides protection for the mask-works of
another country's semiconductor chips only if the other country offers
similar protection on foreign software. These provisions are of greater
interest to the industrialized countries rather than to the developing
countries. To date, the U.S. has granted software protection to 18 trading
partners, all of which are advanced industrialized countries.145 However, if
144 CBI is a one-way free trade area, by which the U.S. extends duty-free import privileges
to most products exported by selected Central American and Caribbean trading partners.
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1986).
145 See Schapiro, supra note 57; World Intellectual Prop. Rep. (BNA) 112 (May 1989).
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the U.S. attempts to apply the same strategy in areas of IP other than
semiconductor chips, it should take into account that the reciprocity
principle conflicts with the WIPO conventions' obligation to apply national
treatment if the technology is covered by them.146 As semiconductors were
not covered by any WIPO conventions, the SCPA reciprocity clause does not
violate the U.S. obligations of granting national treatment under WIPO.
In each of these coercive measures, the U.S. attempts to establish
linkage between a country's IP rights policies and its access to the U.S.
markets and trade preference. These coercive measures meet with a high
degree of foreign resistance and risk significant damage to the U.S. foreign
policy interests. Japan reacted angrily to the announcement of it being
named a Section 301 candidate for barriers to supercomputers, satellites
and forest products, and rejected formal bilateral negotiations.147 Similarly,
Brazil and India termed the Administration's decision as "totally
unjustified, irrational, and unfair. "14.8 The EC Commission has designated
this Section 301 as "a provision of the U.S. trade laws which could be used in
a harmful way against the Community's trading interests" and labelled
this provision as "potentially dangerous to the whole relationship. "149
On U.S. imposition of $39 million tariffs on Brazilian imports to the
U.S., Brazil lodged a complaint with the GATT, charging that the
146See Emmert, supra note 73, at 1350-55.
147 See Japan R~ects Bilateral Negotiations With the U.S. Under Super 301 Provision, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 686 (May 31,1989).
148 See Brazil Says U.S. Action Under Super 301 Will Have 'Negative Effect' on the GATT
Talks, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 688 (May 31, 1989); Indian Trade Minister Says U.S.
Action is "Unjustifr,ed, Irrational, and Unfair", 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 688 (May 31,
1989).
149 EC Report Cites 42 U.S. Trade Barriers, Super 301 Provision Called Major Threat, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 575 (May 10, 1989).
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retaliatory and discriminatory U.S. tariffs violated the latter's obligations
under the GATT. The GATT panel, formed to examine the legality of the
U.S. action, massively supported Brazil's position.150 This is because
Special 301 puts a retaliatory tariff on GATT-protected goods in response to
a non-GATT violation.
Also, GATT acknowledges that developing countries are confronted
by special problems and recognizes that developed countries should "take
account of the special development, financial and trade needs of developing
countries. "151Accordingly, developed countries should "provide differential
and more favorable treatment to developing countries."152 In violation of
this objective, Special 301 does not differentiate between developing and
developed countries in its identification of the priority countries. It is clear,
therefore, that this retaliation is perceived by the GATT members as a
unilateral act in violation of the GATT principles. The end result of the
increased tension is a decrease in U.S. credibility in international trade
negotiations as well as a hampering of any further IP negotiations between
the U.S. and the particular nation.153
Bilateral negotiations can be totally ineffective if a foreign
government simply refuses to give in to the U.S. pressure of enhancing IP
protection. In such a situation, the world trading system would suffer
sanctions that have no beneficial effect at all. Once sanctions are
implemented, domestic support for stronger IP protection may be
150 See U.S. Commitment to Uruguay Round Perceived As Inconsistent With Policies,
Report Finds, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1646 (Dec. 20, 1989).
151General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations: Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, Mar. 29, 1979, art. XXXVI, 18 I.L.M. 1079, 1095.
152 [d.
153See generally Antoinette M. von dem Hagen, supra note 105, at 105-09.
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negatively affected. The burden of trade sanctions would tend to fall upon
the export-oriented sectors that are typically more receptive to arguments in
favor of IP rights protection, while the pirating industries would not be
affected at all and would continue their covert production and sale in the
world markets.154 In addition, bilateral negotiations may be ineffective
where the U.S. bargaining position is weakened by lack of lawful trade or
U.S. government aid.155
Imposing trade sanctions is an imperfect solution because military
and geopolitical considerations may prohibit sanctions against certain
major pirating countries. For example, India may find it politically difficult
to apply sanctions against the People's Republic of China for violations of IP
laws.
Discretionary character of the bilateral measures actually adopted
does not always contribute to the establishment of common standards.
Country by country negotiations can easily lead to inconsistent approaches.
This can be illustrated from the fact that the Brazilian law on software
grants a 25-year term of protection, while the term adopted in the Republic
of Korea was 50 years, and in both cases the duration is shorter than that
generally accepted under international copyright law.156
Last but not the least, these bilateral negotiation settlements may set
the limits for future negotiated outcome with another country.157 For
example, the U.S. may find it difficult to negotiate with India a term of
154 See Primo Braga, supra note 9.
155 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
156 See Gadbaw and Richards, supra note 12, at 29.
157 See Jean M. Dettmann, GAT!': An Opportunity For an Intellectual Property Rights
Solution, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 347 (1991); see also Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at
29.
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software protection longer than that negotiated with Brazil (that is 25
years).
4.3 THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH: GA'lT AND TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF IP RIGHTS
Given the inadequacy in both the current scope of IP protection
worldwide and in the outlook for reform either through bilateral
negotiations or through international IP conventions, the GATr round
provides a most logical and promising vehicle for change.158 The first effort
by the U.S. to heighten GATr sensitivity to IP protection was a proposal for
an anti-counterfeiting code made during the GATr Tokyo Round
negotiations in the late 1970's.159 While the draft was never officially
submitted for consideration, work continued on the code. During 1985, a
group of experts from the developed countries discussed the code and
considered the possibility of broadening GATr discussions to include
infringement of other IP rights. After an extensive debate, and despite
considerable opposition, the U.S., joined by several other industrial
countries, succeeded in placing intellectual property on the agenda for the
Uruguay Round and thus the Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs)
negotiations were born in September 1986.160
158 See generally J. Gorlin, A Trade-Based Approach for the International Copyright
Protection for Computer Software, (1985) (report on major issues in intellectual property
law facing the office of the U.S. Trade representative, in preparation for Multilateral
Trade Negotiations).
159 L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 41, 126, 152 (1984). See also
Bradley, supra note 3.
160 SeeAbbott, supra note 61, at 713.
56
i. U.8. Objectives in the Uruguay Round
The U.S. approach has been to seek a binding, comprehensive, and
enforceable agreement on trade-related IP matters which will substantially
reduce trade distortions resulting from deficiencies in the U.S. trading
partners' protection and enforcement of IP. The four major U.S. objectives
in the TRIPs agreement are to obtain:161
1. Adequate standards of protection that each signatory country must
embody in its laws on patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and
semiconductor lay-out designs;
2. Effective enforcement provisions that specify how intellectual
property rights holders should be able to enforce their rights internally and
at the border through legal action;
3. A mechanism for settling nation-to-nation disputes along the lines of
traditional GATT dispute settlement procedures; and
4. The right under international trade law to apply trade sanctions
when another country fails to live up to its obligations under the agreement.
li. TheProposedGA'IT Codeon IP
On October 28, 1987, the U.S. extended a framework proposal to the
GATT group working on IP.162This proposal included specific
recommendations on substantive standards in the areas of patent,
161 Hearings before the subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (May 14, 1991) (statement of
Ambassador Carla A. Hills).
162 U.S. Framework Proposal to GAIT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4 lnt'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 4, 1987).
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trademark, copyright, trade secrets, and semiconductor lay-out. These
recommendations largely reflected U.S. substantive IP standards. The
proposal suggested that a mechanism to encourage accommodation of
changing technologies should be included in the agreement. Also, it
contemplated the mandatory adoption of minimum national enforcement
standards, including provisions for border measures (e.g., import blocking
and seizure), provisional remedies, and the expeditious resolution of
disputes. Under this proposal, an independent GAIT dispute settlement
mechanism would be established to resolve IP disputes.163
The U.S. proposal specifically contemplates the use of a separate
GAIT code as the institutional mechanism for implementing the new IP
regime. The code would provide a 'discipline' as:
an incentive for all governments to join such an agreement in
order to resolve disputes (arising from IP infringement) under
a multilateral dispute with a strong basis for coordinating
their efforts to encourage non-signatories to adopt intellectual
property regimes in accord with the standards embodied in the
agreement. 164
The U.S. has shown unwillingness to negotiate a GAIT agreement
that establishes standards less protective than those generally existing in
163 Independent dispute settlement mechanisms are used in a number of existing GATT
codes, including the codes on anti-dumping and subsidies. See Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Anti-
dumping), GATl', BISD: TWENTY SIXTH SUPP. art. 15, 171 (1980); Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII (Subsidies), id. arts. 13, 18, at
56.
164 U.S. Framework Proposal, supra note 162, at 1372.
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the U.S. and some other developed countries.165 The EC and Japan also
submitted a detailed proposals to the GATT signatories166 which are similar
to the U.S. proposal in the elaboration of substantive standards.
In June 1988, a collective effort by the U.S., EC, and Japanese
industry groups, Basic Framework of GAT!' Provisions on Intellectual
Property, Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and United States
Business Communities, recognized the difficulties inherent in achieving a
GATT IP consensus in view of the divergence in national interests between
industrialized and developing countries and suggested that incentives
might be required to induce developing country participation in a solution to
the IP problem.
165 EC Presents Detailed Proposal for GAT!' Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights, 5
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, 1012 (July 13, 1988). The suggested norms are--(1) patent
availability for all new inventions with exclusive rights for twenty years from the date that
patent protection is sought; (2) registrability of trademarks and enforced protection of
registered trademarks; (3) copyright protection for all forms of creative expression,
including newer forms such as computer programs, and data bases for the life of the author
plus 50 years; (4) trade secrets provisions broadly defined to include undisclosed valuable
business, commercial, technical or other proprietary nature, with GATT signatories
agreeing not to disclose technical secrets submitted to government officials as a
requirement to do business; and (5) protection for the original layout design of
semiconductor chips.
166 See Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the European Community for the
Negotiations on Trade Related Aspects of Substantive Standards of Intellectual Properly
Rights, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGII/W/26 (July 1988).
5. POssmLE IMPLICATIONSFOR THEDEVELOPING
COUNlRlES
IP problems result from differing attitudes about the ownership of
ideas. Economists in developing countries and politicians assert that IP
protection laws simply perpetuate a system of economic imperialism which
allows developed countries such as the U.S. to maintain a position of world
dominance. 167
The developing countries oppose the establishment of substantive and
uniform standards involving greater protection of IP rights, because of the
implications for their own technological development. They think it would
create oligopoly in high technology. They need access to new technology in
order to foster the development process and participate more fully in world
trade. In countries that have already attained a certain degree of industrial
and technological development, IP protection may well be an important tool
in fostering innovation. Developing countries, however, do not view the
relationship between protection and innovation through the same lens.
Their arguments are grounded on the conception that IP law is to be viewed
as an instrument for economic and technological progress that must strike
a proper balance between the granting of exclusive rights to stimulate the
creation of new technology and the dissemination of both new and old
167 Berkowitz & Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy, 15 CAN. J. ECON. 1,2(1982);
Lyons, International Trade and Technology Policy, in DASGUPTA & STONEMAN,
ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 199 (1987); Peter Gakunu,
Intellectual Property: Perspective of the Developing World, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L.
358, 359-60 (1989).
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technological skills and knowledge. With this approach, the nature and
scope of protection will necessarily vary from country to country and from
one period to another, depending upon the degree of development reached
and the policies chosen to implement differing national views of the public
interest. Many of the today's most developed countries, at earlier stages of
their own industrial growth, often limited the scope of IP protection while
denying protection altogether for certain technologies or product
categories.168 Many industrialized countries, like Canada, have only
recently introduced patent protection of pharmaceutical products, while
others like Finland, Greece, Monaco, Norway, and Germany still exclude
them from protection.169 Also, until recently, the U.S. provided no copyright
protection to the British publishers.170 Americans were once notorious
pirates of books published in Britain.l71 The international system of IP thus
evolves gradually and consensually as the participating countries grow,
establish innovation capabilities, and gain competitiveness in international
markets.
While foreign firms are reluctant to transfer their knowledge to
countries where technology can be easily copied, greater legal protection
168 Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics
and Information, Washington D.C., 1986. United States during its first 100 years has
behaved as many developing countries do today: "When the United States was still a
relatively young and developing country ...it refused to respect international intellectual
property rights on the grounds that it was freely entitled to foreign works to further its
social and economic development." See also Oddi, The International Patent System and
Third World Development: Reality or Myth? 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 856-57 (1987).
169 See U.N. DEFT OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNCTAD SECRETARIAT AND
INT'L BUREAU OF THE WIPO, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN THE TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 92, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19 (1987);
2A J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAWAND PRACTICE app. 2 (1987).
170 See Oddi, supra note 168.
171 Id.
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may not automatically lead to an enhanced process of technology transfer.
IP protection by itself cannot make up for the lack of trained personnel and
of equipment and general infrastructure.172 These are all key factors in
decisions concerning technology transfer. Equally, technology transfer may
not occur, even with legal protection, if other conditions are not met, such
as adequate market size and expected growth or ability of potential licensees
to compete successfully. Licensing decisions are generally based on a
multiplicity of factors, among which IF is not necessarily decisive.173
Stronger IP protection will only strengthen the bargaining position of
property rights holders, which will be reflected in demands for higher
royalties and in the imposition of restrictive clauses of various kinds.174 The
level of royalty rates charged in some fields may altogether deter developing
countries' firms from gaining access to the most competitive technologies,
thereby retarding the technological progress of the developing countries
and strengthening the split between them and the developed countries.
The impact of stronger IF protection on consumers is not sure to be
positive. As a rule, the stronger and broader the exclusive rights, the
higher is the risk of exorbitant monopoly prices175 and of other abusive
practices that may harm consumer interests.176 The high prices charged
for patented pharmaceuticals are a classic example of such a phenomenon.
172See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 28.
173It may be argued, for instance, that the decision to license depends much more on the
solidity of a particular licensing agreement than on the degree of legal protection itself.
174See generally R. Andewelt, Antitrust Perspective on Intellectual Property Protections,
30 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 319 (1985).
175 See Paul J. Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 IOWA L. REV. 959,965 (1991).
176 See ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 28. See also Rushing & Brown, supra note 94, at
27.
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Brazil does not give drugs any patent protection within its borders because
the government does not believe its people should have to pay what is to
them a very high price, for a basic health care commodity.l77 Similarly,
India and Argentina justify the exemption by stressing the critical need of
food and pharmaceutical products to prevent starvation and disease.178
Developing countries' effort to make products affordable for their citizens
whose per capita income is significantly lower than that of the developed
countries may explain some of their resistance to IP protection.
The impact of IF protection on foreign direct investment is quite
uncertain. There is no empirical evidence showing a positive correlation
between a strong system of protection and managerial decisions to
undertake such investments. The availability of legal protection is one
factor taken into account when considering such a decision, but economic
conditions, such as cheap skilled labor, cheap raw material or large
consumer markets, may playa far more significant role.179
It is argued by the developed countries that without certain price
levels the innovative firms would not obtain sufficient resources to justify
continued research and development activities.180 But this argument is not
177Timothy J. Richards, Brazil, in Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 149. See also
COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES, U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT (1989).
178Gadbaw & Kenny, India, in Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 186. Indira Gandhi,
the late Prime Minister of India, summed up her nation's opposition to pharmaceutical
patents by stating that "the idea of a better ordered world is one in which medical
discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no profiteering from life and death." Id.
179See J Dunning, The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and
Some Possible Extensions, 19 J. INT'L BUS. STUD., 13 (1988); A Kirim, Reconsidering
Patents and Economic Development: A case Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical
Industry, WORLD DEV. 1985.
180 See Rushing & Brown, supra note 94, at 28, 29.
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compelling when applied to developing countries because it fails to consider
that research and development expenditures are largely recovered in the
markets of the developed countries. The developing countries' markets are
in most cases marginal and would not normally constitute a primary factor
in determining the rate of investment in research and development.
The developing countries argue that "since the ultimate objective of
IP protection and trade liberalization is economic growth and development,
development considerations must therefore override all others in
determining levels of IP protection."181 Developing countries should not be
made to adopt any new rules that may be inharmonious with their national
development interests. It is argued that it would be inappropriate to come
out with a uniform standard of IP protection taking into account the diverse
technological and economic conditions amongst countries.182 "To legislate
global uniformity in the face of global diversity and plurality" would further
complicate the problem.183
The goal of IP law is to maximize public wealth by providing
incentives to create.184 On a micro-economic level, it can be shown to
provide proper incentives. But no one has ever proved this goal of wealth
maximization at a macro-economic level.185Therefore, it can be very
difficult for a developing country to subject itself to the relatively certain
current revenue losses in exchange for less certain and unquantifiable
long-term benefit of over-all wealth maximization.
181 See Peter Gakunu, supra note 167, at 361.
182 [d. at 362.
183 [d.
184 See Paul J. Heald, supra note 175, at 965.
185 See id. n. 47.
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Some of the other specific implications for the developing countries
may be summarized as follows:
5.1 TIlE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF A STATE TO DETERMINE ITS
ECONOMIC POLICY
The freedom of countries to legislate in accordance with their own
economic and development needs is well recognized under international
law.186 India in its submission to the TRIPs working group in July 1989,
which focuses primarily on patents, argues that:
Every country should .... be free to determine both the general
categories as well as the specific products sectors that it wishes
to exclude from patentability under its national law taking into
consideration its own socio-economic, developmental,
technological and public interest-needs. It would not be
rational to stipulate any uniform criteria for non-patentable
inventions applicable alike both to industrialized and
developing countries or to restrict the freedom of developing
186 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970):
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely
to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue
their economic social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions ofthe Charter.
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974):
Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic
system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with
the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form
whatsoever.
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countries to exclude any specific sector or product from
patentability. 187
It has been argued that the current efforts of the U.S. to strengthen
IP protection are attempts to maintain its economic dominance by
translating its domestic provisions on IP protection into international
standards. This curtails the freedom of the developing countries to select
their own political and economic systems,188 thereby violating international
"principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Ladas, in 1975,
called the imposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the
name of 'harmonization', a polite form of economic imperialism.189 He was
of the view that harmonization refers to the establishment of a uniform law
or laws for certain areas of territories or countries. It generally involves a
forced imposition on a country of the law of another.19o
5.2 ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES
A change toward enhanced IP protection will impose identifiable
significant economic costs on the developing countries as they are typically
187Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1989); See also GAT!': Indian Proposal Says
Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Concessions, 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 953 (July 19, 1989).
188See Primo Braga, supra note 9.
189See 1 S LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975).
190 Id. See also Oddi, supra note 168, at 877.
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net importers of technology.191The economiccosts will comeprimarily in
the form of:
i. Admini~trationand Enforcement
The administrative costs of implementing an effective IF system are
not trivial. The U.S. spends over $300million a year to operate the Patent
and Trademark Office.192Such costs are correlated to the size of the
domestic market and research and development intensity of the economy.
The WIPO's Industrial Property Statistical Report shows that many
developing countries' systems already provide significant patent protection,
which is the most expensive form of protection from an administrative
point of view. Some developing countries with sizable patent officesinclude
Mexico,Brazil, India, and South Korea.193However, many other developing
countries do not have efficient IP registration and enforcement offices and
required expertise. Yamaguchi describes the typical situation in many
developing countries as:
Some of these patent officesreceive several hundred or several
thousand patent applications, filed mostly from foreign
countries such as Japan and the U.S.. These have about ten
examiners in each of these patent officesto examine this large
number of patent applications ....194
191 See Chin & Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade (Nov. 1988)
(Discussion Papers in Economics No. 143, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton
University); ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 28; Primo Braga, supra note 9, at 256.
192 ROBERT P. BENKO, supra note 14, at 181.
193 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12.
194 Y. Yamaguchi, Remarks, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325 (1989).
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For such countries, administrative costs of strengthening IP system would
be significantly high. It would necessitate the introduction of new judicial
and administrative structures and the consequent expenditure on
resources necessary for their functiOning. Unfortunately, there is no
empirical test to estimate the costs that developing countries would face in
bringing enforcement up to the levels prevailing in industrialized
countries. It would be, however, irrational to expect developing countries to
implement highly effective enforcement systems in the short run.
li. IncreasedRoyaltyPayments
Because the developing countries are net importers of knowledge and
technology, strengthening their IP system would tend to increase the level
of payments abroad for proprietary knowledge. For example, patent
statistics show that only one percent of existing patents are held by
nationals of developing countries.195 Patenting activity in developing
countries is dominated by non-resident patentees from the developed
countries. Therefore, expansion of the degree of coverage of patents would
result in higher payments for foreign technology.
ill DisplacementofPirates
Displacement of firms based on piracy, through termination of sales
or payment of royalties, is another related cost. Of course, this would only
be a social cost if piratical activities are displaced by foreigners. This is
based on the assumption that these firms would be wiped out entirely.
195 See Economic Arguments for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Effectively,
TC/wP(88) 70 (1989).
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Some economists believe that from a social perspective, the
displacement of pirates may not entail a welfare loss.196If the piratical
activities are stopped and licenses are issued to the nationals of the same
country, there would be a transfer of income from the pirates to other
nationals and thus not affect the net sales or revenues of the country as a
whole. The "transfer of sales or royalty paYments to other nationals would
represent merely a transfer of income from one member of society to
another and therefore, from the nation's perspective, would represent no
net loss at all. "197
iv. Costs ofAdditional DomesticR&D
This aspect has received little attention in the debate since most
analysts tend to believe that additional R&D is always good.Without
disputing the importance of R&D for economic development, one should
take into account its related costs. New R&D activities spurred by stronger
IP protection may draw resources away from other economic activity, and
this could present a cost.198Nogues suggests that an IP reform could lead to
wasteful R&D ("reinventing the wheel") in economies characterized by high
levels of trade protection.199
196 See Primo Braga, supra note 9, at 256.
197See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 84, at 107.
198 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW54 (2d ed. 1977); Paul J. Heald, supra note
175, at 965; Oddi, supra note 168, at 847.
199Nogues, Patents, Distortions, and Development, PRE Working Paper Series No. 315,
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (1990); Paul J. Heald, supra note 175, at 970. "How
much would computers cost if every manufacturer had to redesign all components from
scratch?".Id.
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v. Anticompetitive EffecCs
A major concern in developing countries over strengthening IP is
that it would not only bring significant increases in prices, but would also
impair the process of technological diffusion. Increased market power
enables the seller to reduce output and raise prices, resulting in a greater
producer surplus increasing static welfare losses.2oo For example,
MacLaughlin, Richards, and Kenny201 estimate that price increases would
be substantial, in excess of 100 percent in some countries, in case of audio
and video products as well as software. They assume that the impact of the
reform on the prices of pharmaceutical products would not exceed 5 percent
because governments would apply price controls to avoid any steeper
increases.202
The economic impact of a reform tends to vary significantly across
countries, depending on the responsiveness of domestic innovators to
higher protection, the responsiveness of foreign direct investment, demand
elasticities for protected products, the volume of existing local infringing
activity, and other factors.
Greater IP protection entails both short-term costs and long-term
benefits for developing countries. But most of the time the short-term costs
are so substantial that it can be very difficult for a developing country to
subject itself to the loss of current revenues in exchange for less readily
quantifiable long-term benefits.203 Therefore, the developing countries
200 See Primo Braga, Remarks, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 309, 316 (1989).
201 MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, supra note 84.
202 Id.
203 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 90.
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advocate 'gradualism', saying that we should wait for countries to reach
the threshold stage, at which they will find that the benefits of IP protection
are no longer remote and so begin to outweigh the costs.204
5.4 GATTORWIPO
The developing countries have made several arguments to support
the claim that GATTdoes not have the competence to take up matters
concerning IP protection. They are of the view that WIPO would be a forum
better qualified to handle questions of IP protection.205WIPO has been
specifically dealing with IP for at least 25 years now. They invoke the
principle of speciality recognized in international law which governs the
respective competences of international organizations and according to
which the competence to deal with specific issues of international law lies
with the organization that has been especially created for this purpose.206
Some authors have claimed that it would be inefficient to repeat in
GATTwhat has already been done in WIPO.207Duplication ofWIPO efforts
would involve waste of time and efforts as WIPO already has a permanent
working staff of people from over 52 different countries, dealing exclusively
with matters of IP.
204 See Primo Braga, supra note 9, at 264.
205 EC and Japan Present Intellectual Property Proposals for Uruguay Round Negotiations,
4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1499 (Dec. 2, 1987).
206 See Joos & Moufang, Report on the Second Ringberg Symposium, in GAIT OR WIPO?
NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29
(F. Beier & G. Schricker eds. 1989).
207Id.
Also, developing countries have traditionally mistrusted the GATI
and called it a "rich man's club where the interests of the developed
countries carry the day."208Much of this attitude comes from the Kennedy
Round in the 1960s and the emergence of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)as an institution that is more receptive
than the GATTto the special interests of the developing countries. The
results of the Kennedy Round did not satisfy the developing countries as
little was done to non-tariff barriers of which they had complained, and
tariff cuts were mainly on goodsof little interest to them.209 This
demonstrates that they lacked the bargaining power to negotiate
concessions of interest to them and that their interests were not adequately
reflected in the results.21oTherefore, the GATI has been accused of being a
tool of the industrialized countries in their effort to maintain and entrench
their domination over world trade and the developing countries. They have
historically gravitated to WIPO where they hold a greater degree of
contro1.211
208 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 47.
209 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 143, at 1144. See also UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE KENNEDY ROUND ESTIMATED
EFFECTS ON TARIFF BARRIERS, U.N. Doc., TD/6/Rev.1 (1968) <hereinafter called
UNCTAD).
210 See UNCTAD, id.
211See Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 86, at 49.
6. BALANCINGOF INTERES'fS: A PROPOSAL
If, in principle, international law permits both the developed and the
developing countries to adapt IP rights to their respective economic
strategies, the problem becomes how to achieve satisfactory relations
between the two groups of states without sacrificing the rights of the IP
owners and without derogating from the basic principles of economic
sovereignty discussed before.212
The GATT offers the possibility of creating a package deal of give-
and-take that is satisfactory to both the sides. 213 This problem can be
addressed successfully in GATT by taking into proper consideration the
concerns of the developed countries, in terms of diminishing the
frustrations of the economic return, and developing countries, in terms of
their national interest and economic development needs. Absolute
acceptance of each group's perspective yields a significantly different result
both with respect to the norms to be observed and the obligation to
compensate for changes. In such circumstances, where there is no global
consensus over the issue of IP protection, the task of the trade negotiator in
GATT should be to establish a compromise perspective. The GATT should
be seeking a mutually advantageous balance of legal rights and
obligations.214
212 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. See also Kwaka, Emerging
International Development Law and Traditional International Law: Congruence or
Cleavage?, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMPoL. 431, 436 (1987).
213 See Joos &Moufang, supra note 206, at 898, 902.
214 See K SIMMONDS & B. HILL, LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GAIT 39 (1989).
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The developing countries face the need to devise IP systems in
resppnse to international requirements, on the one hand, and to their own
development goals, on the other. The task is difficult, because most of these
countries have not yet reached levels of technological development that
would permit them to extract the full benefits obtainable from these systems
in the immediate future. However, greater benefits may be expected as their
economies grow and the technological infrastructure develops.
6.1 MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR TIlE IP CODE IN GATT
Whether a new GATT code on IP will be effective in reducing piracy
and losses to the developed countries' IP owners depends on two factors:
membership and content. A code with high standards and procedural
requirements will be of lit tie use ifit is signed only by a few developed
countries like the U.S., the EC and Japan, which already have high
standards of IP protection. It will be very hard to get the major pirating
countries to sign it. Therefore, such a code would miss the aim of the GATT
negotiations.215 For this reason, a code adopting minimum standards for
protection of IP should be codified under the GATT. These minimum
standards should be derived from synthesis of existing effective national
laws and international treaties and conventions for the protection of IP
rights.216 The GATT members should come to a consensus on what areas of
national laws, treaties and conventions function effectively in the various
areas of IP and bring them together into one code. For example, the U.S.,
215 See Deborah Mall, supra note 27.
216 See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 36.
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the EC and Japan, in their proposals to the GATT working group, agree
that Berne Convention should be adopted as a minimum standard for the
international protection of copyrights.217 This is acceptable to the developing
countries as well because the protection standards in the Berne Convention
are in accordance with their developmental needs. Most of the developing
countries are members of this Convention.218
The code should be "open", that is, it should be a living document that
automatically covers new forms of technology or creativity.219 The EC
Commission suggested a "review clause" for instant coverage of new forms
of innovation, providing for frequent review and renegotiation.220 The
drawback is that it would create a continuous problem of convincing
unwilling countries whenever protection is sought for a new technological
innovation.
6.2 CONCESSIONS BYTIlE DEVELOPED COUNIRIES
The developing countries are not prepared to take action with regard
to IP which would further destabilize their already unstable economies, or
to impose short-term economic hardship on their citizens in exchange for
what the developed countries regard as the long-term economic benefits of
IP protection. In order to persuade the developing countries to take action,
the GATT members must work out a combination of concessions and
compromise acceptable to all signatories, if they intend to achieve a true
217Id.
218 See Figure 1 on page 16-17 of the text.
2194 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1372 (Nov. 4, 1987).
220 See Europe Documents No. 1522, at 3 (July 29, 1988).
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solution to the trade-related problems ofIP, keeping in view that the
unilateral trade sanctions are not most effective and can create a
significant risk of similar unilateral action against the developed
countries.221 Immediate and strict compliance with new IP standards
would result in painful economic dislocations that could be remedied
through a transitional approach. This approach of gradual upgrading of IP
protection would permit them to bring their national laws into conformity
with the new norms and would ease economic dislocation effects.222
The developing countries that make concessions by improving their
protection of IP can be offered concessions in areas of interest to them.
There are a variety of concessions that can be made by the developed
countries in exchange for a GATT agreement on the protection of IP. These
range from concessions with respect to compensation due for IP itself, to
concessions in other trade areas. A package of concessions may be most
appropriate.
As discussed earlier, the developing countries should be allowed a
transition period to bring their national laws into step with the GATT
standards. In this way, the developing countries can sign on to the
framework requiring adherence to minimum standards within a
reasonable amount of time.223
The industrialized countries can offer technical and financial
assistance for the creation or improvement of an IP enforcement
infrastructure. Such assistance could be targeted on the governmental
221 See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
222 See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 27.
223 [d. at 39.
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infrastructure or be industry-specific and could be provided through
WIPO.224 The developed countries could also work closely with the World
Bank and the regional development banks to promote lending programs for
developing countries that demonstrate improved protection of IP.
The other forms of concession would be the granting of certain short-
term privileges to the developing countries. This might involve granting of
reductions by developed countries on standard royalty rates for some period.
Along the same lines, the developed countries, especially the U.S., could
consider softening its stand on compulsory licensing.225An arrangement in
which the IP industries are compensated for wealth transfers by national
tax incentives would help to channel the energies of the market into the
creation of a viable concessionary structure.
Other concessions would involve granting more favorable terms in
GATT negotiating areas other than IP. GATT's primary function is to
facilitate the trading of concessions among various areas under
negotiation.226 As all the fifteen areas under negotiation in the current
round "can be seen to form a single, multifaceted but interrelated pattern of
general business ..... regulation,"227 compromises with regard to some
should facilitate agreement with regard to others. This "package deal
effect" of the Uruguay Round is a good hope for all proponents to solve the
IP problem in GATT.
224Id.
225See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD U-50 (A Jacobs 4th ed. 1989).
226 See O. LONG, LAWAND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 98 (1985).
227 See Fikentscher & Lamb, The Principles of Free and Fair Trading and of Intellectual
Property Protection in the Legal Framework of a New International Economic Order, in 1
REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: GERMAN LEGAL COMMENTS 84
(T. Oppermann & E.U. Petersmann eds. 1987).
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The developed countries should let the developing countries
determine the level and scope of protection of IP rights "in particular
sectors which are of special public concern such as health, nutrition,
agriculture and national security."228The governments of developing
countries believe that knowledge that can cure illness and feed populations
should be in the public domain and not be traded as private property. The
most politically volatile issue included in the negotiations appears to be the
extension of patent protection for pharmaceutical products.
The developed countries should develop plans for direct investment
earmarked for technological development in the developing countries. This
would be of particular interest to the developing countries as increased
foreign direct investment not only provides the developing countries with
foreign exchange, but it also creates jobs and an industrial infrastructure
for future growth, and technology. The developed countries could, in
essence, invest a portion of the benefits they would gain from the
elimination of piracy. They could support the R&Dprograms in the
developing countries if the innovations which result from the R&Dwould
receive adequate IP protection. Such commitments might have a very
significant impact on the attitude of the policymakers in the developing
countries.
Gadbaw and Richards suggest that the IP owners in the developed
countries could provide licenses to the former pirates at a free market rate
agreed to by both governments.229This would enable the pirates to continue
to produce in the same line of business and ultimately piracy would be
228 See News of Uruguay Round, GATT Pub. No. 90-0751 (June 1, 1990), at 9.
229 See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 12, at 28.
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eradicated. This approach could cover up the problem of increasing
unemployment subsequent to the introduction of IP protection.
An area not specifically "trade-related" but offering considerable
promise is that of developing country debt reduction. One of the conditions
of debt relief could be commitment to enhance protection for IP. Some
developing countries could possibly be enticed by offers of some kind of a
"Brady Plan", on accession to the GATTcode.23oAnother substitute would
be increased loan or other financial guarantees within the World Bank or
the International Monetary Fund for those countries that demonstrate
enhanced IP protection.231 A large number of countries could be included in
a program that involved the trading of debt for enhanced IP protection. The
USTR, Carla Hills, has now apparently signalled a willingness to condition
debt relief for Brazil on improved IP protection.232
The industrialized countries may continue to condition the grant of
tariff concessions to the developing countries under the GSP program on
adherence to an IP agreement. The U.S. grants benefits to a number of its
trading partners on a case-by-case basis.233 However, this remedy could
prove effective only against those countries who rely heavily on the U.S. for
their exports.
230 Under the so-called "Brady Plan", the industrialized countries had made over $30
billion in pledges to the developing country debt-reduction programs as of June 1989. Japan
alone had pledged a contribution of $4.5 billion to the World Bank as of that date. See Japan
Pledges $2 Billion for Debt Crisis: Country has Already Committed to $4.5 Billion to Brady
Plan Initiative, WASH.POST, June 14, 1989, at 2, colA.
231 See Kastenmeier & Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise,
Risks and Reality, 22 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 285,303 (1989).
232 Hills Backs Using Brazil Debt in Bargaining on Patents, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1989, §
C,at3.
233 See supra notes 132 and 144 and accompanying text.
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To encourage adherence, the GATTcode on IP protection would be in
effect only among the signatories to the GATTcode,who would enjoy the
benefits and rights thereunder on a most-favoured-nation basis. These
benefits, rights and obligations under the GATTcodewould automatically
be extended fully and equally only to the signatories to the GATTcode.A
signatory would be afforded "national treatment" of exports in the country of
any other signatory nation.234 Also, improved market access can be offered
as an incentive to sign on to the GATTcode on TRIPs.
A code of conduct could be laid for the multinational enterprises in
different countries, in order to prevent the abuse of concentration of
economic power. Multinational enterprises could be obliged to respect the
antitrust laws of their home state if the antitrust laws of the host state are
not fully developed. This would put an effective check on the misuse of their
market power due to enhanced IP protection in the developing countries.
A survey of 50 developed-country firms (U.S. and European) that
were involved in the industrial fields of chemicals, electrical products and
pharmaceuticals and that had transferred technology to firms in Latin
American countries, concluded that these firms made "almost no
contribution to local R&D operation" in Latin America.235 The code could
require the multinational enterprises to increase R&D in the developing
countries for certain endemic problems and for the development of
technological infrastructure.
234 See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 38.
235 See Oddi, supra note 168, at 848; Greer, The Case Against Patent Systemsin Less
Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223 (1973).
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The code could provide for exceptions to the least developed countries
by giving them more time and exemptions from the obligations of the code.
In the longer ron, these countries would be subject to code obligations and
the developed countries could help them with the installation and working
of the 'IP protection' infrastructures.
The Basic Framework of GATTProvisions on IP, which encompass
the views of the U.S., the EC and Japan, sets out the dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms which should be adopted by the TRIPs
negotiators in the GATT.It suggests that a specialized dispute settlement
mechanism should be included in the code to address only IP rights
infringement which should be based on the current dispute resolution
mechanism found in Article XXIII of the GATT.236There should be
provisions for the formation of a single panel composed of technical experts
within the GATTwho can be assembled easily when the dispute arises.
This mechanism would be brought into effect by the initiative of the
individual parties; a private party would request its government to use the
TRIPs dispute resolution mechanism.237
Three enforcement mechanisms set out by the GATTFramework to
ensure and maintain the agreed upon minimum standards are: First, the
owners of IP rights in signatory countries would be able to stop the
infringing imports at their borders.238Second, the owners of IP rights in
signatory countries, when confronted with the infringing product that has
been produced locally or abroad, would be able to obtain remedy through the
236 See GATT FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 31.
237Id. at 32.
238Id.
-
local courts.239 Third, where such owners are unable to obtain redress
through the local courts, their own government will be able to invoke the
dispute resolution mechanism of the GATTcode.24o This three-tiered
enforcement structure would be able to resolve the international disputes
arising due to the IP problem.
In sum, a variety of concessions can be made available by the
developed countries to the developing countries in order to obtain an IP
agreement. An approach using multiple instruments may have the
greatest prospect for success.
239 [d.
240 [d. at 35.
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7. CONCLUSION
While the proposals discussed so far in the GATTnegotiating group
have given prominence to the granting of higher protection to the IP
owners, the aspects related to technology transfer and diffusion, are
virtually absent from the current debate. Discussions under this approach
would have to address also the issues which are of particular interest to
technology importing countries.241 The reinforcement and expansion of IP
protection in developing countries is not likely to create, of itself, more
favorable conditions for technological development or growth in
international trade. Free flow of important technology and information is
imperative for the technological growth and economicprogress of the
developing countries which would ultimately enhance the world trade and
economic prosperity of all the nations. The interdependence of the
prosperity of the developed and the developingworld is well stated by the
late Stephen Ladas, who was one of the leading supporters of the
International Patent System:
Failure to extend the benefits of technology and science to large
parts of the world is not only morally wrong, but in the long
241 Following issues are of special interest to the developing countries:
(i). Remedies for insufficient disclosure of the invention, (ii). Remedies for lack of use or
inadequate use of patented inventions, (iii). Avoidance of unjustifiable or abusive
restrictive practices in licensing agreements, (iv). Provisions for the facilitation and
promotion of transfer of technology to developing countries, (v). Exemption from
patentability of certain subject-matter: e.g., plant varities and animal breeds, foods and
drugs and processes relating to their manufacture, (vi). Limits on the scope of protection of
computer programmes under copyright law etc .. For details, refer to chapter 4 of the draft
international code of conduct on the transfer of technology (TO/CODE TOT/47).
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run it denies to the total system its ultimate fulfillment.
Prosperity like peace is invisible. The accelerated pace of the
West's own economicprogress could be nullified by the failure
of the rise in the standard of living of the largest part of the
world.242
Finding an acceptable balance between public and private use,
between the sharing of knowledge and the marketing of information, have
never been easy. GATTdisciplines on TRIPs are not a panacea to the IP
problem although they seem to be a worthwhile goal in the long run.
Recognizing that the growing alternatives of unilateral and bilateral
actions can easily backfire and also lead to the contamination of other
negotiating areas in the GATTnegotiations, many developing and
developed nations have nowjoined in the current GATTendeavor to solve
the IP problem. The increasingly flexible attitude of the developing
countries suggests that a final consensus lies within reach, provided that
their special needs and requirements are taken into account by the
proponents of stronger IP rights protection.
The challenge for developing countries is great, as is the
responsibility of the international community to ensure that the new rules
do not deepen the present economicand technological asymmetries.
The outcome of the Uruguay Round is still uncertain. Although
significant disagreement persists, especially in a North-South context,
242 Ladas. Existing Uniformity of Industrial Property Laws and Revised Patent of
Introduction: Means for Transfer of Technical Information to Less Industrialized
Countries, 12 IDEA: THE PATENT TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 163
(1968).
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considerable progress towards a workable agreement has already been
made. If further progress is made and extended to TRIPs, a stronger and
more harmonized IP system seems likely to emerge. However, the result is
not to be expected tomorrow, the movement will be evolutionary rather than
revolutionary.
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